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Abstract 
Thailand is among one of the first non OECD countries to have successfully introduced a 
form of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in 2002. This policy defines a natural 
experiment for the evaluation of the effects of public health insurance on health 
behaviours. In the present paper, we look at the impact of the Thai UHC on preventive 
activities, risky behaviours and healthcare consumption using data from the 1996, 2001 
and 2003 Health and Welfare Survey of Thailand. We use double robust estimators 
combining propensity scores and linear regressions to estimate Difference-in-Differences 
(DD) and Difference in DD (DDD) models. Results offer important insights. First, 
previously uninsured men and women increased their preventive activities (check-ups) 
more than any other groups. At the same time, there is no evidence of either an increase 
in risky behaviours or a reduction of preventive efforts by the newly insured population. 
In other words, we find no evidence of ex ante moral hazard. Regarding healthcare 
consumption, we see that hospital admissions increased by 2% and outpatient visits 
increased by 13% due to the UHC. Overall, these findings imply positive health impacts 
among the Thai population who entered in the UHC. 
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1. Introduction 
Government commitment to extend healthcare access to the general population is usually 
known in the literature as Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Although the central idea of a UHC 
is to provide a package of basic health services without causing financial hardships to the user 
(Savedoff et al., 2012), regardless of his/her social status or income, the actions and the 
institutional settings chosen might vary widely from country to country (Moreno-Serra and 
Smith, 2012). Importantly, any UHC system requires a proper institutional setting and a certain 
degree of income redistribution. Despite the obvious appeal of the concept, its implementation 
in low or middle income countries might not be practical and politically straightforward.  
Thailand is among one of the first non OECD countries to successfully introduce a form of UHC. 
In fact, the UHC had long been advocated by health reformists in the Ministry of Public Health 
and the Health Systems Research Institute.  During the electoral campaign, the Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) used the catchy slogan of "30 Baht treats all diseases", meaning that the party was 
willing to introduce a tax-based UHC with a fixed co-payment fee of 30 Thai Baht (US$ 0.75 at 
the time). By 2002, Thailand successfully provided UHC in all its geographical areas. 
This paper examines the impact of the Thai UHC on preventive activities, risky behaviours and 
healthcare consumption using data from the 1996, 2001 and 2003 Health and Welfare Survey 
of Thailand. To identify the impact of the programme on the above mentioned outcomes, we 
need to isolate the impacts of other variables that may have also caused the change in the 
outcomes. Such variables as household income and other policy changes are usually time-
changing confounding factors (Lee, 2005). For this purpose, we adopt the Difference-in-
Differences (DD) approach. An additional Difference in DD (DDD) analysis is also performed to 
relax the DD's typical identifying assumption of parallel trends. 
Measuring the impact of the Thai UHC is important for many reasons. First of all, although 
health protection for everyone represents one of the main goals for low and middle income 
countries, the debate on the best ways to achieve this goal is far from over since a UHC is not 
the only possible approach. In this sense, two specific, and somehow contrasting concerns, 
were raised regarding the magnitude of the impact of the programme. On the one hand, budget 
constraints might have reduced its potential impact, not affecting the utilization of health 
services among poor households. On the other hand, the UHC's essentially free nature might 
3 
 
set perverse incentives driving to overconsumption of healthcare and a reduction in the 
preventive efforts by the newly insured (i.e. ex ante moral hazard). Since co-payments have not 
been increased (actually dropped in 2007) and costs of healthcare have been raising 
constantly, both concerns are still shared among experts from different fields. Indeed, part of 
these worries were confirmed by the authoritative recent Oregon Experiment (Baicker et al, 
2013), where Medicaid has been shown to increase financial protection and accessibility to 
healthcare services, but with ambiguous impacts on health and healthy behaviours.  
The Thai UHC deserves more attention also because it represents an important case study for 
many other Asian countries involved in the process of universalizing the access to healthcare. 
In commenting about the strengths and the weaknesses of the Chinese health system, for 
example, Li et al. (2011) draw important lessons from the Thai UHC, defined as a successful 
experience for a developing country. Also, the Thai way seems to have gained a consistent 
political consensus both within the ASEAN economic community and across the whole Asia. 
For example, in a recent ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) Health Ministers’ meeting in 
July 2012, it was reported that “Thailand would transfer its knowledge to help regional 
countries, including Japan, South Korea and China, fully implement universal health coverage”  
(Sarnsamak, 2012).  The extent to which the Thai experience could and should be exported to 
other Asian contexts obviously depends on its capacity to provide actual health benefits to the 
general population. Precise impact evaluations of the 2002 policy innovation can then still 
provide important evidence relevant for the actual health policy and political debate.  
Results offer important insights. First, previously uninsured women increased their preventive 
activities (check-ups) more than any other groups, consistent with the findings of Gruber et al. 
(2012). At the same time, among the informal workers that entered the UHC in 2002, smoking 
decreased while drinking rate remained stable. Hence, there is no evidence of either an 
increase in risky behaviours or a reduction of preventive efforts by the newly insured 
population. In other words, we find no evidence of ex-ante moral hazard.  Regarding healthcare 
consumption, we see that hospital admissions and outpatient visits increased due to the UHC. 
We also provide weak but consistent evidence that the UHC implied a switch from informal 
(traditional healers) to formal medicine. Overall, we interpret these findings as showing that 
the UHC increased healthcare consumption without causing significant increases in 
opportunistic behaviours.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a policy background. Section 3 
introduces the data. Identification and the empirical approach are discussed in Section 4 while 
results are presented in Section 5. The last part of the paper discusses the findings and 
concludes.  
2. Background: the Universal Health Coverage in Thailand 
The Universal Health Coverage in Thailand was introduced in 2001. Before, the provision of the 
UHC and public health insurance was limited to certain groups of citizens. In particular, 
government and formal sector private employees were fully covered by a mix of private 
payrolls and government subsidies (through the Civil Servants Medical Benefit Scheme, CSMBS, 
and the Social Security Scheme, SSS, respectively). In addition, the poor and vulnerable groups 
(elderly, children below the age of 12, the disabled, war veterans, and monks) were covered by 
the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS). These schemes were altogether covering less than two-
thirds of the population, leaving informal sector employees and farmers out of any form of 
health insurance (Evans et al., 2012). Rather than changing the structure of the whole system, 
the TRT "added" the UHC as another independent public health insurance scheme. The Thai 
UHC scheme was then to cover everyone not already being insured by either the CSMBS or the 
SSS. Thus, those who were previously eligible for the MWS were transferred to the UHC. Ten 
years later, this three-tier scheme still exists, although proposals for setting a unified National 
Health Insurance system have been repeatedly discussed.   
In terms of coverage, the UHC has been very successful. The number of people under the 
scheme in 2008 was around 47 million (4.2 million for the CSMBS and 9.1 million for the SSS). 
According to the World Bank, 99.5% of the Thai population is  now covered by at least one type 
of health insurance.  
In more details, the UHC provides a comprehensive benefit package stipulated in a contract 
between purchaser and provider at every level of health services. The benefits can be classified 
into three groups: the curative package, covering outpatient and inpatient services (with some 
exclusions); high-cost care, adopting a similar package to the one provided by SSS; disease 
prevention and health promotion, entailing immunizations, annual physical checkups, 
counseling, voluntary HIV counseling and testing, and antenatal care and family planning 
services (Wibulpolprasert and Thaiprayoon, 2008). 
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Beneficiaries must register with a primary contractor, typically a Community Hospital at the 
district level, from which they are entitled to free care: up until 2006, a co-payment of 30 Baht 
(approximately 0.75 US$) was required both for inpatient and outpatient services, with 
exemptions for previous beneficiaries of the MWS. Moreover, beneficiaries are not allowed into 
secondary or tertiary care units without referral from the primary contractor, except for 
accidents or emergency situations. The contracting of primary healthcare services and referral 
backup are intended to guarantee the rational use of resources by level of care, preventing the 
bypassing of ordinary care for unnecessary specialist hospital care (Tangcharoensathien et al., 
2010). 
The payment scheme of the contractors is mixed, comprising capitation for outpatient care, 
prevention and promotion (plus additional fees for certain services), a fee schedule (centrally 
managed) for accident and emergency intervention outside the registered network, and global 
budget plus DRG (Diagnose-Related Groups) for inpatient services. The financing method of the 
scheme rests on progressively levied general tax revenue rather than on a contributory system, 
which, in a country with more than 50% of the population in the informal sector and a lively 
presence of very small establishments, is considered administratively difficult from the point of 
view of collecting and enforcing contributions (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2010). Moreover, 
financing out of general tax revenue results in a greater progressivity of health care finance 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2007), a quality that suits well the pro-poor spirit of the reform. 
Regarding the impact of the Thai UHC, most of the evidence focuses on the financial impact of 
the new insurance system on the income of Thai families, especially the poorest. Limwatton et 
al. (2011) show that, while in 1992 health expenditure among the poorest households was 
8.17% of their monthly income comparing to 1.27% among the richest decile, in 2006 these 
figures were 2.23% and 1.07% respectively. General taxation and lack of co-payment 
mechanisms should also be associated to effective redistributive patterns. The pro-poor nature 
of the scheme is evident from the consistently progressive Concentration Indexes pointed out 
by Tangcharoensathien et al. (2010) and Limwatton et al. (2011). Moreover, catastrophic 
payments appear to have dropped sharply in all the income quartiles  (Somkotra and Lagrada, 
2006).  
Although positive health effects following the introduction of different UHC schemes in other 
Asian countries can be found in the literature (e.g. Lee et al., 2010), the link between health 
6 
 
insurance and health outcomes is sometimes challenged in the literature (e.g. Levy and 
Meltzer, 2008). Regarding Thailand, the evidence is surprisingly limited only to the very recent 
literature. Patcharanarumol et al. (2011) shows that Thailand achieved good maternal and 
child health after the introduction of the policy. More recently, Gruber et al. (2012) show that 
the Thai UHC significantly reduced infant mortality among the poorest, while Wagstaff and 
Manachotpong (2012) find a negative effect of Universal Coverage on the likelihood of people 
reporting themselves to be too sick to work.  
Finally, the impact of the Thai UHC on healthcare consumption has been analysed by 
Panpiemars et al (2011) on a sample of 640 hospitals across the whole Thailand.  They find 
that while the outpatient visits increased after the UHC, the number of inpatient and the 
average length of stay decreased after 2002. Although these findings are only partially in line 
with ours, it should however be pointed out that all the results in Panpiemars et al (2011) rely 
on aggregated data. In their case, identification is obtained by comparing aggregated data at 
hospital level before and after the introduction of the UHC (i.e. before/after study). Our 
approach here relies on individual-level data, comparing the trends of healthcare consumption 
between a treatment and a control group. This  allows for a more precise identification of the 
policy impact.   
3. Data 
The dataset used in this study is the Health and Welfare Survey conducted by the National 
Statistics Office of Thailand (NSO).  This survey is a household survey where all members in the 
selected household are interviewed. The information asked include each household and each 
member's demographic and socio-economic characteristics (such as age, gender, income, work 
status, occupation and education), health status, health care utilization, expenditure on health, 
smoking, drinking and exercise patterns. A stratified sampling framework was employed for 
the surveyed households to represent their municipal area, province and the entire country. 
Each household is given a survey weight. It is worth noting that the Health and Welfare Survey 
was not collected at a regular frequency during our period of interest, which is before and after 
2002 when the UHC was introduced. It was collected every five years before 2001. Then, every 
year after 2003. The sample size of this survey increased over time. The pre-2001 surveys 
covered about 45,000 households; while the number increased to approximately 65,000 
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households by the mid-2000s.  In this paper, we use the 1996, 2001 and 2003 data to evaluate 
the impact of the UHC on preventive activities, risky behaviours and healthcare consumption.  
4. Methods 
We adopt the Differences-in-Differences (DD) approach to measure the impact of the UHC on 
preventive activities, risky behaviours and healthcare consumption. By design, the control 
group has to be formed by those who were unaffected by the UHC. Since the UHC aimed to 
cover everyone except those who were under either the CSMBS or the SSS, the CSMBS and the 
SSS beneficiaries would serve as our control group. This group can be directly identified from 
the  Health and Welfare survey.  
The treatment group, on the other hand, should cluster all the individuals that before 2001 
lacked any form of insurance. These individuals are easy to identify from the 1996 and 2001 
surveys. In 2003, however, we do not have complete information about the past insurance 
status. In particular, we are not able to distinguish between people previously covered by 
private insurance cards  (e.g. Volutary Health Insurance) and people who were not insured 
before 2002.  Our treatment group for 2003 is thus constructed by selecting only the 
individuals with a sufficiently high probability of being uninsured in 2001. Specifically, from 
the 2001 survey we calculate, conditional to a set of observable variables, two propensity 
scores: one for being uninsured and one for having an insurance card.  The estimated 
parameters are then used to predict the two probabilities of reporting being covered by the 
UHC for the individuals in 2003. Each person is finally assigned to the category for which the 
estimated probability is higher. Other definitions of treatment group are also used below in 
order to test the robustness of the results to the definition of the treatment group used here 
(see Section 6). 
Given an outcome variable (Y), we will compare the change in Y for the treatment group with 
the change in Y for the control group. If the UHC had an impact, the change in Y would not be 
the same for the treatment and the control group.  
It is important to note that any DD analysis relies on the parallel trend assumption (Lee, 2005). 
That is, without the policy, the change in outcomes in the treatment group should be similar to 
the change in the control group. This way, we can interpret differences in the differences as 
only due to the treatment/policy. However, the parallel trend is a rather strong assumption 
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since the trends of the outcomes can differ between the treatment and the control groups. For 
this reason, when possible1, it is preferable to allow for group-specific pre-treatment trends, 
resulting in a Differences in the DD model (DDD). In a DDD, instead of assuming that the 
outcomes in the two groups would change by the same amount, we allow for different pre-
treatment trends for the two groups (see, for example, Wagstaff, 2010). More specifically, we 
assume that the trends we could observe before 2002 (between 1996 and 2001) for each 
group separately would be maintained also in 2003 if the UHC had not been introduced.     
The most important criticism to a DD applied to non-randomized data is that  people with 
particular unobservable characteristics might select themselves into the treatment group (i.e. 
selection bias). As a result, the  treatment effects estimated by the DD method would be biased 
‒ picking up not only the real treatment effects but also the unobserved differences. In our 
case, however, we do not believe that the DD estimation results would be subject to a serious 
selection bias problem.  Firstly, if the treated and control individuals are fundamentally 
different in their behaviours, the differences in DD (DDD) would be able to account for this 
through the group-specific pre-treatment trend. Secondly, even if we cannot observe whether 
people moved out of the formal sector in order to obtain UHC, the likelihood of this happening 
is rather small. The UHC package is not any better than the existing SSS and CSMBS and having 
a stable formal job is likely to be considered as more attractive than having an unstable 
informal job. Indeed, from our perspective, the Thai UHC represents a natural experiment 
where selection into treatment is ruled out by a unique policy design. 
 
Besides identification, the estimation technique can make a difference to the final results.  A 
good methodology is to reduce the bias from observable confounders. Stratification, regression 
or matching can be used for such purpose. In our analysis, we adopt the Double-Robust (DR) 
estimator (Bang and Robins, 2005; Robins, Rotnitzky and Zhao, 1995; Lunceford and Davidian, 
2004) as defined in the implementation of  Emsley et al. (2008).  
 
According to this method, the average causal effect for the difference in the outcomes (Y) 
between the control and the treatment group in one year is found by a three-step process. In 
the first step, classical propensity scores pi (i.e. the probability of being in the treatment group 
(T) conditional on a set of each individual's characteristics, X) are computed for each 
                                                          
1 The DDD computes group-specific trends using pre-treatment data. Thus, it requires at least 2 periods of pre-treatment data. 
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individual. In the second step, the outcome Y is regressed on X for each group. Predicted values 
of Y,        ̂  and         ̂ ,  are computed for each individual within each group. Finally, the 
Lunceford and Davidian (2004) index for the Double-Robust estimator is calculated for each 
year (t): 
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This estimator is called double-robust because it applies both propensity-scores-probability 
weighting and linear regression. As pointed out by Emsley et al. (2008), when both models are 
correctly specified, the DR estimator is a semiparametric efficient estimator. If only one of the 
two is valid, the DR estimator is offering protection against misspecification. Obviously, when 
both models are misspecified, the resulting estimate will be biased, but all alternative methods 
would be as well. The variance of the DR estimator is provided in Lunceford and Davidian 
(2004) and is applied here.  
 
Once the    is calculated for each year, the DD and DDD estimators can then be obtained as 
follows (see, for example, De Preux, 2011): 
 
                 
and 
                                    
 
The standard errors of the DD and DDD are obtained from the bootstrapping method. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. The total sample for the three waves of the Health 
and Welfare survey includes 94,800 observations. Of these, 65,766 are used for the DD 
analysis.   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Outcome variables are reported at the beginning of the table. In general, treated individuals 
display less healthy behaviours than their control counterparts. For example, they are more 
likely to smoke and less likely to have medical check-ups.  Patterns related to drinking, instead, 
show a partially different picture, as in 2003 treated individuals are found to drink less than 
control ones, and to engage less in dangerous activities like driving while intoxicated. In terms 
of health utilization and health outcomes, treated individuals are less likely to have outpatient 
visits and are more likely to seek treatment from traditional healers. In addition, treated 
individuals are less likely to be hospitalized (almost 50% less than controls), but at the same 
time they tend to stay longer in hospital.  
The mean out-of-pocket expenditure for inpatient episodes is higher in the treated group. An 
exception applies to the year 1996 where the CSMBS patients were still allowed to be 
hospitalized in private hospitals, but were subject to a 50% copayment. This copayment could 
contribute to out-of-pocket expenditure for the control group. However, from 1998, private 
inpatient usage was restricted to only emergency cases. Inpatient care for CSMBS patients 
were only allowed in public hospitals where there was no copayment. This could explain why 
the out-of-pocket expenditure for hospitalizations decreased sharply after 1998 for the control 
group. 
Socio-demographic variables are relatively stable across groups and years. The control group is 
in general slightly older than the treatment group, but this difference should not be worrying 
and it gets smaller for more recent waves. The proportion of females in the treatment sample 
changes by year. However, in general, women represent around 40-47% of the sample. It is 
difficult to find a clear pattern for what concerns the civil status of the subjects. The majority 
are married or single. People working in the informal sector have more children. This is in line 
with the fact that they are more likely to have no education and less likely to hold a university 
degree. Government employees are around the 35% of the overall sample. Since they are all 
covered by the CSMBS, they are all in the control group. Also, note that, as should be expected, 
the employees in the formal sector are less likely to have no-education and more likely to have 
a university degree. Finally, regional variations in the distribution of different healthcare 
schemes, which seem to play a particularly important role in the 1996 survey, tend not to differ 
significantly between the two groups in later waves.  
FIGURE 1  ABOUT  HERE 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of three main variables of interest (hospitalizations, outpatient 
visits and smoking) across age and by treatment/control status. The full-body lines represent 
the non-linear (quadratic) fit of the data aggregated by age for all individuals not covered by 
either the CSMBS or the SSS, while the dotted lines are for the control group. The comparison 
between these distributions in 2001 (pre-policy period) and 2003 (post-policy) graphically 
shows the pattern  that is particularly important for our analysis: the gap between the 
treatment and the control groups tends to narrow down in 2003 as compared to 2001. For 
hospitalizations and outpatient visits, this gap reduction is present across all age groups and is 
particularly more accentuated for the elderly.. For smoking, the gap is reduced among the mid-
old age, while for the youngsters the smoking gap seems to have reduced less.  
5.2 Estimation results 
Although, as shown in Table 1, confounders are relatively well distributed in the original 
sample, we first show how propensity scores perform in our sample. It is worth noting that 
these scores are not directly used for a matching-based estimation of an average causal effect, 
but only indirectly as probability weights in the calculation of the DR. The test is based on the 
standardized bias, which for each covariate computes the difference in means between treated 
and controls, standardized by the square root of the sum of variances in each group. These 
biases were computed by performing nearest neighbour matching in each year. Results are 
reported in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
It can be noticed that matching on the propensity scores performs well in reducing biases. As 
the treatment and control groups are defined essentially on the basis of their work status 
(which is what determines the eligibility of an individual for CSMBS and SSS insurance), 
matching does not reduce the bias in variables concerning the work status of individuals, 
particularly the government employees. Other variables--especially those related to age, family 
composition and education--are very well balanced across the two groups after matching. Two 
measures that prove the overall quality of the procedure are the mean and median of the 
absolute standardized biases. These two statistics jointly consider the biases in all the variables 
included in the analysis, and should be considerably reduced after matching has been 
performed. Given a threshold of standardized mean difference of 20 (as suggested in 
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Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985), it can be inferred that in all the three years matching is very 
effective in balancing covariates. This is because the mean absolute biases are all below 15, and 
the median absolute biases are all below 5. These evidences once again confirm the 
appropriateness of our procedure. 
Table 3 reports the results for both the DD  and the DDD analysis. The DD analysis is necessary 
for all the variables that do not appear in the 1996 surveys.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
For lifestyle indicators, the gap in the prevalence of risky behaviours between the treated and 
the control group is either not affected or reduced by the UHC. People in the treatment group  
smoke and drink relatively more than others. However, this is true regardless of the UHC. 
Smokers and drinkers actually reduced their smoking and drink driving more than the control 
group.  At the same time, no significant impact on drinking is detectable.  
The most interesting result here is however related to preventive check-ups, a variable that is 
more directly linked to the introduction of the UHC. The impact of the policy is clear: between 
2001 and 2003 the difference between the treatment and the control group in the probability 
of going through preventive check-ups reduced by almost 70%. For women, for example, while 
before the UHC the probability of a check-up was 16% higher for a formal worker, after the 
enactment of the reform this difference dropped to a 5% (i.e. an impact of more than 11%). 
The picture emerging from these figures is consistent with the idea of a substantial demand for 
preventive medicine which could not be met due to the lack of insurance among the informal 
sector. In this sense, the UHC might also have a significant effect in terms of reduction of future 
healthcare costs due to earlier and more precise diagnoses.  
The Universal Coverage also had an impact on the likelihood of being hospitalized. Before the 
UHC, there was a 2% difference between groups in the probability of receiving inpatient 
healthcare, a difference that basically disappears in 2003. Also the average length of stay for 
the hospitalized informal employees increased (not significantly) after the introduction of the 
UHC, a result that might be more related to the incentive system designed for providers than to 
actual patients’ demand. Similar results but with greater magnitude in the gap reduction are 
found for the outpatient visits. In particular, before the Universal Coverage was introduced, 
there was a clear downward trend in the use of outpatient care for the informal sector. The 
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parallel trend assumption is not consistent with this picture and the DDD results are more 
reliable: the UHC boosted an increase in the outpatient care of around 13%. Similarly, we find a 
marginally significant reduction of 1.7% in the probability of reporting oneself as ill, in line 
with Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012). Finally, as found by most of the existing literature, 
the out-of-pocket expenditure is also found to reduce significantly due to the UHC. 
6.  Additional evidence 
In order to explore more in depth the effects of the policy, the analysis was also performed on 
specific subsets of the sample, so as to identify whether there were any noteworthy patterns 
related to certain demographic groups. In particular, the impacts of the Universal Coverage on 
preventive activities, inpatient and outpatient services were investigated splitting the sample 
according to age (adults aged between 20 and 45 and between 45 and 80), gender, and 
municipal vs. rural area.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Results are reported in Table 4. Smoking decreases in all the groups considered, although 
almost twice as much among the elderly and women. Drinking is not affected by UHC. This is 
also consistent with the results obtained from using the entire sample, with the exception of a 
5 percentage points decrease  in women’s drinking behaviour. The likelihood of being 
hospitalized increases by 3-4 percentage points in all subsamples, and especially so among the 
elderly, females, and in rural areas. Similarly, out-of-pocket expenditures drop in every group: 
the most pronounced effect is observed for men (about 7800 Baht decrease),  followed by the 
old and those living in municipal areas.. The average length of the last stay in hospital increases 
significantly only in the group of women and for people living in towns (5.6 and 6.5 more days 
spent in the hospital, respectively). Reporting illness, in turn, shows a significant decrease only 
among the elderly and men. Finally, the likelihood of using outpatient services shows a sizeable 
increase in all the investigated subsamples: remarkably, in this case the least pronounced 
effect is found among the elderly (7 percentage point increase), whereas for other groups the 
DDD estimator is well above 10 percentage points.  
The impact of the policy, therefore, appears to be quite evenly distributed across the 
population, since most of the health indicators under study are found to be significantly 
affected in the same direction for all subgroups. The differences that arise between one group 
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and the other may suggest that, despite the widespread effect of the reform, some categories of 
individuals might be benefiting more. The differences between men and women favour 
alternatively both groups, depending on the outcome under study. On the other hand, elderly 
people benefit more than the youngsters in almost all the investigated dimensions as expected.  
The fact that in many instances the rural group is outperformed by those living in municipal 
areas might come as an odd, given the explicit target of the policy towards the rural sector. 
However, it can be observed that the likelihood to be hospitalized increases more in this group, 
and that at the same time the reporting of minor illnesses is reduced (although not significantly 
so) only among these people, pointing to a more pronounced impact of the reform on these 
dimensions. Moreover, if we imagine that countryside men and women are generally poorer 
than those in towns and cities, the fact that these people experience a higher increase in their 
likelihood to be hospitalized clearly reinforces the interpretation of an income effect at work, 
allowing poorer individuals to expand their budget set and in this way to obtain the treatment 
they need. This line of thought might appear in contrast with the results for out-of-pocket 
expenditures. However, it is plausible that less-poor people are more likely to have used more 
expensive inpatient services before the implementation of the UHC, while the poorest may 
have not been able to bear high hospitalization expenses, in this way incurring lower costs for 
medical care. 
Another interesting result emerging from a preliminary, descriptive analysis is about 
traditional medicine. It appears, in fact, that between 2001 and 2003 there was a reduction in 
the rate of the UHC beneficiaries treating their illness with the services of a traditional healer 
(from 2.5 to 1.5 percent), together with an increase in the figure for formal outpatient services 
(from 51.6 to 56 percent). Results for the control group, instead, show a slight increase in 
usage of traditional medicine (from 1 to 1.1 percent) and an equally thin rise in the rate for 
formal medical care (from 67 to 67.7 percent). Given that absolute numbers were very low 
(only 51 observations reported to have used traditional medicine in 2003), we had to forego a 
formal inferential analysis of these interesting patterns, leaving these issues for future 
research, maybe with the support of a more specific dataset. However, this evidence is 
consistent with the idea that access to health insurance, with the drop in expenditures it 
entailed, could induce a substitution effect between formal medical services and these 
alternative forms of care, in favour of the former. If these lines of thought are proven correct, 
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the  UHC scheme would entail a beneficial increase in the amount of medical care provided to 
citizens through a switching of patients from less effective treatments.  
One important final issue is related to the definition of the treatment group. The approach 
taken in this paper is to include in the 2003 treatment group all the individuals that were likely 
to be uninsured in 2001. However, one might think that other definitions of the treatment 
group might be equally suitable in this context. In particular, the most relevant alternative is to 
include all the uninsured, regardless of their insurance status before 2001. After all, the UHC 
applies also to these people. Obviously, since these individuals were receiving some forms of 
health insurance, their inclusion in the treatment group is expected to reduce the impact of the 
UHC. Indeed, this treatment group realistically sets a lower bound for the estimation of the 
impact of the UHC. In table A1 in the Appendix we report the results the DD and the DDD 
estimation with this definition of the treatment group.  The main conclusions from Table 3 do 
not change substantially, showing that estimates are particularly robust. Specifically, the only 
relevant  difference is in the smoking variable. When this larger treatment group is considered, 
the UHC does not seem to have any significant impact on smoking prevalence.  This suggests 
that people with voluntary insurance cards in the pre-UHC period were also the ones less likely 
to smoke. Another variable that is quantitatively affected by the new definition of the 
treatment group is the out-of-pocket expenditure, though the reduction in the impact of the 
UHC in this case is expected.  
7. Discussion    
In this paper we investigate the impact of the introduction of a Universal Health Coverage 
scheme in Thailand in 2002. The analysis relies on almost 95,000 subjects included in three 
waves (1996, 2001, 2003) of the Thai Health and Welfare survey. Performing a series of DD 
and DDD analyses, we are able to identify the effects of the UHC on healthcare consumption 
and preventive behaviours. If our results are correct, the UHC seems to have levelled the 
playing field, where not only those holding a formal job could get a subsidised access to health 
care services. Results however must be considered with caution. Here we tackle a number of 
points relevant for their interpretation.  
The first set of interesting findings is that the UHC does not have a negative impact on the 
preventive activities of the Thais covered by the new governmental insurance scheme. Indeed, 
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we could not find any evidence of a change in drinking rate. If anything, we found that the UHC 
reduced smoking prevalence.  
These results can be interpreted within the stream of literature related to healthcare insurance 
and opportunistic behaviours. Since the original work of Pauly (1968) the idea that an insured 
individual does not internalize the cost of the health service, thus taking more risks ex ante and 
consuming more healthcare ex post (i.e. moral hazard), has influenced the policy debate in 
many countries. The well-known RAND experiment, detecting significant levels of 
overconsumption among the people randomly assigned to insurance groups with low or no co-
payments, set the stage for the empirical and the experimental evidence on this topic (Manning 
et al., 1987). Regarding ex ante moral hazard, the most recent literature has produced some 
further interesting evidence. The most recent randomized evidence in this sense comes from 
the Oregon experiment (Baicker et al, 2013), where a group of uninsured low-income adults in 
Oregon was selected by lottery to be given the chance to apply for Medicaid. Two years after 
the beginning of the experiment, some of the evidence pointed towards an increase in the 
smoking prevalence gap between the treatment group selected by the lottery and the control 
group who lost the lottery. This difference, however, was not statistically significant. Recent 
non-experimental evidence comes from Spenkuch (2012), who finds moral hazard among 
Mexican families after the introduction of the Seguro Popular en Salud, while Steinorth (2011) 
shows that the same phenomenon is observed when looking at the Health Savings Accounts in 
the US. Evidence on ex post overconsumption of healthcare has been found, for example, by Liu 
et al. (2012) in Croatia, van Dijk et al. (2012) in the Netherlands and Sapelli and Vial (2003) in 
Chile. Note, however, that all these studies, with the exception of Spenkunch (2012), identify 
the effect by looking at changes in the co-payment rate or in the additional insurance. Not 
much was known about the sudden introduction of a comprehensive UHC among people 
previously uncovered by any formal health insurance.  
Regarding ex-ante moral hazard, our findings tell a different story, showing that in the case of 
Thailand the UHC was not associated to an increase in risky behaviours. Of course the presence 
of ex-ante moral hazard might have been counterbalanced by anti-smoking and anti-drinking 
campaigns. However, these campaigns should have a different impact on the treatment and the 
control groups. Moreover, while tobacco control policies might well have been at work in 2002, 
alcohol has become a public health priority only in more recent times. If anything, our results 
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thus show that it was relatively straightforward for Thailand to prevent any serious perverse 
incentive effect of the UHC on the health behaviours of the newly insured.  
Besides a lack of support for ex ante moral hazard, we find that the number of hospitalizations, 
check-ups and outpatient visits has significantly increased due to the UHC. Most importantly, 
the positive impact is mainly driven by the fact that the UHC reduced the pre-2002 gap between 
formal and informal workers regarding the use of these services. In our view, these results 
confirm the “access motive” pointed out in Nymann (1999), i.e. when insured, people consume 
more healthcare because they can afford something that without insurance would have been 
too expensive to buy. 
One problem with this view is the sudden and significant picking up of the number of check-up 
visits following the UHC introduction. Typically, check-up visits by healthy people are sensitive 
to the phenomenon of ex post moral hazard. In theory it can thus be more difficult to interpret 
this specific result in terms of increased accessibility to health services. However, in our data 
the likelihood of having a check-up visit for individuals under the UHC is always lower than for 
individuals in the control group, even in 2003. Unless one is willing to assume significant levels 
of insurance-driven overconsumption in the SSS and CSMBS schemes, the convergence 
between different schemes should show that before 2002 under-consumption of preventive 
healthcare among informal workers might have been the norm and that the UHC partially 
corrected this substandard trend. Moreover, note that these results are confirmed also when 
looking at women separately, something that appears to be in line with the results in Gruber et 
al. (2012).     
Our findings also show a significant increase in the length of stay in hospital for certain 
subgroups of the population due to the UHC. This result is likely to be driven by the incentive 
system at the hospital level. Initially in 2002, providers were given the option of receiving 
reimbursements based on either total capitation or capitation for outpatient services and the 
DRG for inpatient services at the provincial level. However, UHC began using a single payment 
system in 2003. On the opposite, the CSMBS used a DRG payment system, which implicitly 
encourages lower length of stay and fast hospital discharges.  
Reducing the financial burden from sickness is one of the main objectives of the UHC. In doing 
so, however, the system should also work on the extensive margin, including people that would 
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not have used a service otherwise. Altogether, our results show that the UHC did not only 
reduce the financial burden related to health expenditures at family level (consistent with the 
previous literature), but effectively enabled a broader access to medical care without seriously 
affecting risky behaviours.  
Positive conclusions should not be overstretched. The approach taken here is to explicitly 
prioritize the internal validity of the study, building on a coherent and rigorous identification 
mechanism. The extent to which the short run effects of the UHC can be projected on the 
medium and long term remains to be evaluated. The trade-off here is evident: the further away 
we move from the implementation time, the more difficult it becomes to interpret any DD 
model as a causal effect. Endogenous UHC innovations such as differential investments or 
changes in the incentive structure and external factors like the economic cycle or modifications 
of the pension system might influence individual behaviours even more than the UHC itself, 
making it difficult to isolate one effect from another. Although questionable, our identification 
strategy is thus deliberate and explicitly motivated. In addition, it should be pointed out that 
the  subsequent Health and Welfare surveys do not contain comparable questions to the 2001 
and 2003 ones. Hence, in analysing medium run impacts we would have had to give up part of 
our outcome variables. 
Finally, one last note regarding the interpretation of our findings. Clearly, the quest for 
universal access to healthcare is raising and goes beyond the evaluation of its impact. Health 
represents a fundamental part of human capital and provides a necessary condition for a well-
functioning life. Thus, universal access to health care can be the goal in itself. Such a goal can be 
justified independently from its actual impact in terms of usage and moral hazard distortions ‒ 
relying on a purely ethical a priori background (Roger, 2007) or on a well-known 
“functionings-capabilities” approach (Sen,  1985, 1992). In providing results related to the 
impact of the UHC, we are by no means claiming that equity and ethical issues should not play a 
role, or even represent the main drivers for the implementation of a universally accessed 
healthcare system. However, given an objective (in our case, universal access to health care), it 
is still true that different policies might in principle be implemented to reach it. Such 
alternatives may depend, among other things, on the stage of development of the country, on 
the quality of its institutions and on the political acceptability of the various policy proposals. 
In this sense, by pointing out the encouraging effects of the Thai UHC, our paper provides 
evidence that, among the diverse tools available to policy-makers to grant the right to health to 
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their citizens, a government-based Universal Coverage scheme may well be a valid candidate in 
this direction. . 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Outcomes 
VARIABLES Year 1996  
Year 2001 
 
Year 2003 
  Treated Controls   Treated Controls   Treated Controls 
Smoking  0.421 0.251  
0.36 0.206 
 
0.291 0.185 
Drinking 0.37 0.381  
0.421 0.382 
 
0.434 0.44 
Drinking and Driving N/A N/A  
0.493 0.475 
 
0.47 0.481 
Check-Up N/A N/A  
0.078 0.363 
 
0.474 0.728 
Check-Up (Women) N/A N/A  
0.09 0.356 
 
0.135 0.334 
One Hospitalization 0.038 0.041  
0.038 0.064 
 
0.047 0.06 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 5489.8 9155.5  
6286.5 1917.6 
 
2918.7 1438.5 
Frequence of Hosp N/A N/A  
3.894 3.818 
 
1.272 1.216 
Days in Hospital 7.335 6.324  
6.381 6.181 
 
6.116 5.628 
Being Sick 0.123 0.102  
0.122 0.108 
 
0.144 0.156 
Outpatient 0.544 0.584  
0.516 0.671 
 
0.561 0.677 
Traditional Healer 0.022 0.01  
0.025 0.01 
 
0.015 0.011 
CoVariates 
VARIABLES Year 1996  
Year 2001 
 
Year 2003 
  Treated Controls   Treated Controls   Treated Controls 
 
        
Age 38.09 36.72  
39.28 37.76 
 
39.53 39.18 
Children 0.891 0.677  
0.79 0.656 
 
0.714 0.595 
Female 0.477 0.474  
0.396 0.496 
 
0.419 0.492 
Single 0.177 0.239  
0.194 0.231 
 
0.214 0.202 
Married 0.758 0.714  
0.703 0.715 
 
0.666 0.738 
No Education 0.049 0.009  
0.043 0.007 
 
0.028 0.008 
University 0.023 0.238  
0.074 0.403 
 
0.094 0.376 
Government Employee 0 0.34  
0 0.431 
 
0 0.379 
Employer 0.035 0.011  
0.074 0.017 
 
0.086 0.023 
Bangkok 0.087 0.176   0.098 0.096   0.085 0.101 
Observations 20337 8697   22780 27964   5842 9180 
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Table 2: Balancedness Test - Standardized Percentage Bias 
                    Year 1996 
 
Year 2001 
 
Year 2003 
VARIABLES Sample   Treated Controls % Bias 
 
Treated Controls % Bias 
 
Treated Controls % Bias 
Age Unmatched 38.091 36.716 12  
39.285 37.759 13.8 
 
39.534 39.176 3.3 
 
Matched 
 
38.083 38.921 -7.3 
 
39.285 39.168 1.0 
 
39.540 39.254 2.6 
Children Unmatched 0.891 0.677 22.6  
0.790 0.656 14.1 
 
0.714 0.595 13.7 
 
Matched 
 
0.885 0.892 -0.7 
 
0.790 0.782 0.8 
 
0.713 0.724 -1.3 
Bangkok Unmatched 0.087 0.176 -26.5  
0.098 0.097 0.7 
 
0.085 0.101 -5.6 
 
Matched 
 
0.088 0.098 -3 
 
0.098 0.100 -0.5 
 
0.085 0.078 2.3 
No Education Unmatched 0.049 0.009 24.1  
0.043 0.007 23.5 
 
0.028 0.008 14.9 
 
Matched 
 
0.046 0.049 -1.4 
 
0.043 0.032 7 
 
0.028 0.024 2.8 
University Unmatched 0.023 0.238 -67.3  
0.074 0.403 -83.7 
 
0.094 0.376 -70.4 
 
Matched 
 
0.023 0.025 -0.5 
 
0.074 0.075 -0.4 
 
0.094 0.099 -1.2 
Female Unmatched 0.477 0.474 0.7  
0.396 0.496 -20.2 
 
0.419 0.492 -14.7 
 
Matched 
 
0.477 0.463 2.9 
 
0.397 0.371 5.2 
 
0.419 0.397 4.5 
Single Unmatched 0.177 0.239 -15.3  
0.194 0.231 -9.1 
 
0.214 0.202 3.1 
 
Matched 
 
0.177 0.160 4.1 
 
0.194 0.182 2.8 
 
0.214 0.198 4.1 
Married Unmatched 0.758 0.714 9.9  
0.704 0.715 -2.5 
 
0.666 0.738 -15.8 
 
Matched 
 
0.759 0.789 -6.9 
 
0.704 0.725 -4.7 
 
0.667 0.699 -7.1 
Mean Absolute  Unmatched 
  
28.4 
 
  
25.5 
   
27.5 
Standardised Bias Matched 
   
7.9 
 
  
10.9 
   
11.1 
Median Absolute  Unmatched 
  
19.2 
 
  
13.7 
   
15.9 
Standardised Bias Matched 
   
2.9 
 
  
2.5 
   
3.2 
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Table 3: DD and DDD estimates 
 
OUTCOME DID 2001-1996 [95% Conf. Interval] DID 2003-2001 [95% Conf. Interval] DDD [95% Conf. Interval] 
       Preventive Activities 
Smoking 0.029 [-0.003; 0.023] -0.039** [-0.035; -0.004] -0.068** [-0.057; -0.005] 
Drinking 0.032** [0.006; 0.032] 0.019 [-0.013; 0.025] -0.012 [-0.034; 0.016] 
Drinking and Driving N/A -0.060** [-0.099;  -0.009] N/A 
Check-Up N/A 0.090** [0.016; 0.085] N/A 
Check-Up (women) N/A 0.111** [0.078; 0.147] N/A 
Inpatient 
One Hospitalization -0.018** [-0.026; -0.012] 0.017** [0.007; 0.023] 0.034** [0.022; 0.044] 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 3848.5** [2055.1; 5863.6] -2738.3** [-4690.2; -1280.5] -6586.8** [-10587.8; -3993.9] 
Days in Hospital -1.709** [-4.92; -0.08] 1.601 [-0.68; 4.3] 3.310 [-0.25; 8.04] 
Frequency of Hospitalizations N/A 0.078 [-0.09; 0.275] N/A 
Outpatient 
Reporting Illness 0.009** [0.005; 0.033] -0.008 [-0.027; 0.002] -0.017** [-0.050; -0.008] 
Using Outpatient Services -0.1** [-0.159; -0.068] 0.035** [0.007; 0.106] 0.136** [0.091; 0.242] 
**p-value<0.05 
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Table 4:  Heterogeneity Analysis for the DDD 
OUTCOME   YOUNG OLD   MALE FEMALE   MUNICIPAL RURAL 
          Preventive Activities 
Smoking 
 
-0.047** -0.091** 
 
-0.056** -0.08** 
 
-0.076** -0.075** 
Drinking 
 
-0.014 0.034 
 
0.022 -0.053** 
 
0.012 -0.03 
Inpatient 
One Hospitalization 
 
0.034** 0.04** 
 
0.03** 0.045** 
 
0.039** 0.046** 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 
 
-7075.7** -7223.2** 
 
-7802** -6497.6** 
 
-7050.24** -5923.2** 
Days in Hospital 
 
2.955 3.145 
 
0.492 5.601** 
 
6.521** 1.808 
Outpatient 
Reporting Illness 
 
-0.001 -0.061** 
 
-0.031* -0.006 
 
0.004 -0.027 
Using Outpatient Services 
 
0.14** 0.071** 
 
0.12** 0.125** 
 
0.152** 0.149** 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 
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Table A1: Lower bound: DD and DDD Estimates  
       
OUTCOME 
DID 2001-
1996 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
DID 2003-
2001 
[95% Conf. Interval] DDD [95% Conf. Interval] 
       Preventive Activities 
Smoking        0.013 [-0.00; 0.02] 0.003 [-0.01; 0.02] -0.006 [-0.02; 0.01] 
Drinking 0.021** [0.00; 0.03] 0 [-0.01; 0.01] -0.19 [-0.03; 0.01] 
Drinking and Driving N/A -0.075** [-0.113;  -0.038] N/A 
Check-Up N/A 0.068** [0.040;  0.092] N/A 
Check-Up (women) N/A 0.098** [0.059;  0.120] N/A 
Inpatient 
One Hospitalization -0.02** [-0.03; -0.01] 0.014** [0.00; 0.02] 0.034** [0.02; 0.04] 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure 2419** [119; 4007] -683 [-1528; 14] -3102** [-5262; -880] 
Days in Hospital         0.99 [-1.54;  4.25] -2.24 [-5.26; 0.04] -3.231 [-9.29; 0.65] 
Frequency of Hospitalizations N/A 0.07 [-0.02; 0.19] N/A 
Outpatient 
Reporting Illness 0.015** [0.00; 0.02] 0.001 [-0.01; 0.00] -0.016 [-0.03; 0.00] 
Using Outpatient Services -0.1** [-0.15; -0.06 0.017 [-0.05; 0.07]  0.123** [0.02; 0.20] 
**p-value<0.05; N/A: data not available 
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